A detailed account of the handling of the transports by Admiral Turner -
THE BATTLE OF SAVO ISLAND
August 9th, 1942
STRATEGICAL AND TACTICAL ANALYSIS
Prepared by Department of Analysis, Naval War College
Commodore Richard W. Bates, USN (Ret)
Commander Walter D. Innis, USN
OPERATIONS OF CTF 62
With the passage of midnight both transport groups , XRAY and YOKE, were busily engaged unloading oar go, primarily ammunition and rations. This unloading had been proceeding slowly during the previous two days for a number of reasons, the more important being the necessity (a) to await orders to land cargo after a beachhead had been secured, (b) to cease un-loading on orders from the beach, (c) to get underway, move into unloading berths and then anchor, (d) to get underway to avoid enemy air attacks, (e) to man General Quarters stations, and (f ) to divert ships boats temporarily to other ships. About one-half the actual time available was employed in above operations.
Just before midnight, CTF 62 had completed a conference on board the McCAWLEY with CTF 62.6 end the Commanding General, First Marine Division. After this conference broke up, CTF 62 sent a dispatch at about 0100 to CTF 61 stating in parts "Air attacks today resulted in loss of ELLIOTT, severe damage JARVIS. Probably increasing tomorrow, and absence of air support requires me to withdraw all ships temporarily from this area to avoid unwarranted loss.” Unfortunately, a portion of this dispatch was garbled, as received by the WASP. Since the original is not available to this study, it is not clear what else CTF 62 reported to CTF 61. But it is surmised that it had something to do with the withdrawal of the carriers.
After sending out the above message, and while waiting to hear from the Commanding General, First Marine Division concerning the logistic situation ashore at Tulagi, CTF 62 turned his attention to the unloading operations of his transports and cargo ships at Guadalcanal* He had dearly dismissed the possibility of night attack by surface ships when he decided that the Japanese force - contacted at 1026, August 8th - was en route to Rekata Bay.
At 0145 he observed the aircraft flares dropped in Area XRAY by a Japanese plane** At the same time, he heard heavy gunfire to the westward in the channel south of Save Island. What his reactions were at this time are not recorded. He had not expected such an attack at this time. However, when he approved CTG 62.6 f s night screening disposition, it is clear that he shared that Commander's confidence that the Allied screening groups constituted adequate force properly placed for the very purpose of repelling an enemy surface attack. Therefore, he does not appear to have been greatly alarmed by the situation which suddenly developed at 0145.
The majority of the transport and cargo ships in Area XRAY, upon sighting the aircraft flares, promptly discontinued unloading operations, darkened ship, went, to General Quarters, and at about 0150 some of them got underway without orders so as to be able to maneuver in case of attack. It is evident that the Commanding Officers clearly appreciated the threatening danger. The night was dark, there were frequent rain squalls which gave poor visibility - as low as 500 yards at times - and low clouds, all of which gave excellent cover to an attacking ship, and it appeared wise to clear the anchorage and head for deeper water and maneuvering room.
The handling of these transports and cargo ships by the responsible officers: at this time, in the light of weather conditions, was excellent; and ahead unusually fine training and fine discipline. All of the ships were "milling around" in close proximity to each other and yet no ships collided and none opened fire on a friendly ship. It is pertinent to quote the Commanding Officer of an AK, who stated; "It is most remarkable that none of our ships of the transport group fired on any other ship during the entire period, although all ships must have had each other covered; the slightest mismove on the part of any one would have caused much indiscriminate firing."
Meanwhile, CTF 62 could see the gun flashes, but he heard nothing from his commanders concerning the nature of their opposition. He must have been anxious for an immediate report. However, he took no direct action, but left the conduct of the battle to CTG 62.6. He did not know that CTG 62,6 and the AUSTRALIA had not rejoined the screening group; for that officer - in deciding not to rejoin his command - had failed to notify CTF 62 of this fact.
However, CTF 62 eventually learned of the absence of CTG 62.6; for, in all probability, he intercepted the dispatch from that officer at 0226 to the CHICAGO, VINCENNBS and CTO 62.4 asking if they had been in action. He probably also intercepted the CHICAGO' a reply that she had been in battle but was not now, and CTG 62.4' s reply that his group had not been in action. It is highly probable that CTF 62 had also noted that CTO 62.6 was unable to get any replies from the QUINCY, VINCENNES or ASTORIA.
Later on, at about 0249, CTF 62 seems to have Intercepted a dispatch from the CHICAGO to CTO 62.6 which stated that the CHICAGO, which was south of Savo Island, had been hit by a torpedo and was slightly down by the bow; that the enemy ships had been firing to seaward; and that the CANBERRA was on fire with two destroyers standing by.
What CTF 62 thought, now that he had discovered that CTO 62.6 was missing from the battle area and that his ships had suffered severely, is nowhere stated; but it is significant that he took no action even to consult with CTO 62.6 by TBS voice or C.W. radio. It is likely that he believed that CTO 62.6 was capable of handling the situation, and therefore he should not interfere with him at this critical time. It also appears likely that he felt confident that, once that officer understood the rapidly developing situation, he would immediately inform him.
At 0310, CTF 62 received a message from CTO 62.6 which stated that a night action between surface ships was underway near Savo Island, but that as yet he had not been able to determine its character. CTF 62 then realised that CTO 62.6 knew as little as he did about the action, which was far from reassuring.
This situation must have become critioal - to his way of thinking - when at 0330 he intercepted the expected dispatoh from COMSOPACFOR to CTF 61 approving the withdrawal of TO 61.1. CTF 62 then promptly sent a dispatch to CTF 61 at 0340 in which he reported: "Surface attack on the screen coordinated with use of aircraft flares. CHICAGO hit torpedo. CANBERRA on fire." This message indicates a hope on the part of CTF 62 that CTF 61 might delay his planned withdrawal of TO 61.1 from the area in view of the bad news. Unfortunately, as will be pointed out later,this vital message was not received by CTF 61 until about eight hours later.
At 0410, CTF 62 received a message from the PATTERSON reporting the CANBERRA out of commission.
About this time, CTF 62 likely sensed that his screening forces had been heavily damaged, but the fact that his transports had not been attacked gave him assurance that perhaps the screen had succeeded in driving off the enemy raiding forces. Had he realised that actually they had not done so, but that instead there had been an almost open lane to his transports and cargo ships for the past two hours, he would have experienced great concern. As it was, he concluded that the execution of his tentative plan of retiring at about 0630 was now even more urgent than he had originally thought. He must depart or lose his ships. He could not be delayed! Even though the Commanding General, First Marine Division had not yet returned from Tulagi with the logistics Information upon which CTF 62 tentatively planned to base the time of his withdrawal, he now reached a decision to set his withdrawal time at 0630. For at 0435 he released two messages. The first was addressed to the Task Force, and read* "It is urgent for this force depart this area 0630!" The second message, addressed to CTO 62.6, read: "If CANBERRA cannot join retirement in time, she should be destroyed. Our departure urgent!
The decision to destroy the CANBERRA was probably an extremely difficult decision for CTF 62 to make. He of course knew that there was an over-all shortage of Allied combatant ships in the Pacific, and that every ship was vital for future operations. He had every reason to fear that his own cruisers, if not already sunk, would probably be out of action for some time while undergoing repairs. Finally, it is probable that he considered the effect that the destruction of the CANBERRA might have on Australian public opinion.
He appears to have based his decision on the following: He was retiring; he could not tow the CANBERRA away without air cover, as he would merely invite Japanese attack upon her - either by submarine or aircraft - and would probably lose thereby not only the CANBERRA but also one or more of the towing ships, which necessarily would be cruisers or destroyers. He oould not leave her to fall into Japanese hands, for if not salvaged by them, at least she would be thoroughly searched and studied. The correctness of this decision is borne out somewhat by the Executive Officer, CANBERRA who later stated: "It was realised the position was hopeless, and orders were given at approximately 0515 to stop efforts to save the ship and to prepare for abandoning. The list at this time had increased to about seventeen degrees and there had been internal explosions and rumblings.
At 0515, CTF 62 intercepted a message from the RALPH TALBOT to CTG 62.6 stating that she had been badly damaged and needed help.
At 0525, he was aware of gunfire on bearing 290°(T) from hie position; but he did not know the source of it - as he later indicated in a dispatch to CTF 61. This firing, which ceased at about 0527, was exchanged between the PATTERSON and the CHICAGO which had mistaken one another for enemy and had opened fire, fortunately without damage.
By this time, CTF 62 was becoming concerned about his unloading operations which had been interrupted by the transports and cargo ships getting underway at 0150. At sunrise, 0632, he noted that they were still underway. It is not clear whether he had heard as yet from the Commanding General, First Marine Division as to the logistics requirements at Tulagi. Certainly that Commanding General had not as yet returned to the MoCAWLEY.
The Commanding General, First Marine Division has recently stated that, after he had consulted with the senior officers at Tulagi – COMTRANSDIV EIGHT and the Commanding General Group YOKE (Tulagi) - apparently on board the transport NEVILLE, he had sent CTF 62 a dispatch by TBS voice radio from the SOUTHARD (probably initiated after 0500 when he had returned on board the SOUTHARD).**** This dispatch is not available to this study. However, Commanding General, First Marine Division states that to the best of his recollection he reported "that there was a day and a half of fire of ammunition ashore, that there was approximately three days of rations, that the island had not been completely secured; that TF 62 should not sail until more ammunition and rations were put ashore; and that he urged at least six hours more unloading before sailing." Whether or not this message was finally received by the MoCAWLEY (CTG 62 *s flagship) cannot be determined; but it is known that the SOUTHARD endeavored to send it throughout the remainder of the night.
Received or not, it seems clear that CTF 62 knew at this time that he had not succeeded in landing adequate supplies since his 2325 conference with the Commanding General, First Marine Division and CTG 62.6. He had learned this in part from his Assistant Chief of Staff who stated: "I had personally visited most of the transports of the Tulagi Transport Group that night and (had) urged the Commanding Offioers, including the Transport Group Commander, to get supplies unloaded, stating that these were Admiral Turner's orders."
CTF 62 once again had to choose between two alternatives* Should he remain until he had landed sufficient supplies to insure that the Marine oombat power was adequate to accomplish its objectives and thereby take the chance of losing many of his ships; or should he retire promptly, bearing in mind that he would thereby be jeopardising the Allied land operations through lack of sufficient logistic support and threatening the complete failure of the entire operation? Ha did not long delay in his decision. He correctly decided to remain and at 0641 informed CTF 61 of this decision as follows t "Unable depart as planned because insufficient supplies have been landed. Request air cover for attack on enemy surface forces this area. In this message, CTF 62 had plainly inferred that any losses which his command might suffer while unloading on the 9th - with or without air cover - were now warranted. This was a reversal of the decision expressed in his dispatch at 0106 wherein he had stated that it was necessary to retire to avoid unwarranted loss. and is an excellent example of CTF 62’s ability to recognise that the situation had changed - a primary qualification for command.
At 0644, COMDESRON FOUR reported the ASTORIA was in flames, and four destroyers were picking up her survivors.
A few minutes later, CTF 62 reported to CT6 62.6 along similar lines: "ASTORIA on fire. Captain and crew trying to save. Apparently QUINCY sunk. No news VINCENNES. Believe TALBOT sunk. Believe ships ran into submarine and surface torpedo trap.” This dispatch reveals the confusion which was in CTF 62' s mind, even at this late hour, concerning the nature of the night battle and once again points out the necessity for a subordinate to keep his interested commanders informed as to the progress and nature of any action in which said subordinate may be engaged.
Between dawn and about 0700, transports and cargo ships, which had been milling around in Iron Bottom Sound, had returned to their anchorages and had commenced unloading again.
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THE BATTLE OF SAVO ISLAND
August 9th, 1942
STRATEGICAL AND TACTICAL ANALYSIS
Prepared by Department of Analysis, Naval War College
Commodore Richard W. Bates, USN (Ret)
Commander Walter D. Innis, USN
OPERATIONS OF CTF 62
With the passage of midnight both transport groups , XRAY and YOKE, were busily engaged unloading oar go, primarily ammunition and rations. This unloading had been proceeding slowly during the previous two days for a number of reasons, the more important being the necessity (a) to await orders to land cargo after a beachhead had been secured, (b) to cease un-loading on orders from the beach, (c) to get underway, move into unloading berths and then anchor, (d) to get underway to avoid enemy air attacks, (e) to man General Quarters stations, and (f ) to divert ships boats temporarily to other ships. About one-half the actual time available was employed in above operations.
Just before midnight, CTF 62 had completed a conference on board the McCAWLEY with CTF 62.6 end the Commanding General, First Marine Division. After this conference broke up, CTF 62 sent a dispatch at about 0100 to CTF 61 stating in parts "Air attacks today resulted in loss of ELLIOTT, severe damage JARVIS. Probably increasing tomorrow, and absence of air support requires me to withdraw all ships temporarily from this area to avoid unwarranted loss.” Unfortunately, a portion of this dispatch was garbled, as received by the WASP. Since the original is not available to this study, it is not clear what else CTF 62 reported to CTF 61. But it is surmised that it had something to do with the withdrawal of the carriers.
After sending out the above message, and while waiting to hear from the Commanding General, First Marine Division concerning the logistic situation ashore at Tulagi, CTF 62 turned his attention to the unloading operations of his transports and cargo ships at Guadalcanal* He had dearly dismissed the possibility of night attack by surface ships when he decided that the Japanese force - contacted at 1026, August 8th - was en route to Rekata Bay.
At 0145 he observed the aircraft flares dropped in Area XRAY by a Japanese plane** At the same time, he heard heavy gunfire to the westward in the channel south of Save Island. What his reactions were at this time are not recorded. He had not expected such an attack at this time. However, when he approved CTG 62.6 f s night screening disposition, it is clear that he shared that Commander's confidence that the Allied screening groups constituted adequate force properly placed for the very purpose of repelling an enemy surface attack. Therefore, he does not appear to have been greatly alarmed by the situation which suddenly developed at 0145.
The majority of the transport and cargo ships in Area XRAY, upon sighting the aircraft flares, promptly discontinued unloading operations, darkened ship, went, to General Quarters, and at about 0150 some of them got underway without orders so as to be able to maneuver in case of attack. It is evident that the Commanding Officers clearly appreciated the threatening danger. The night was dark, there were frequent rain squalls which gave poor visibility - as low as 500 yards at times - and low clouds, all of which gave excellent cover to an attacking ship, and it appeared wise to clear the anchorage and head for deeper water and maneuvering room.
The handling of these transports and cargo ships by the responsible officers: at this time, in the light of weather conditions, was excellent; and ahead unusually fine training and fine discipline. All of the ships were "milling around" in close proximity to each other and yet no ships collided and none opened fire on a friendly ship. It is pertinent to quote the Commanding Officer of an AK, who stated; "It is most remarkable that none of our ships of the transport group fired on any other ship during the entire period, although all ships must have had each other covered; the slightest mismove on the part of any one would have caused much indiscriminate firing."
Meanwhile, CTF 62 could see the gun flashes, but he heard nothing from his commanders concerning the nature of their opposition. He must have been anxious for an immediate report. However, he took no direct action, but left the conduct of the battle to CTG 62.6. He did not know that CTG 62,6 and the AUSTRALIA had not rejoined the screening group; for that officer - in deciding not to rejoin his command - had failed to notify CTF 62 of this fact.
However, CTF 62 eventually learned of the absence of CTG 62.6; for, in all probability, he intercepted the dispatch from that officer at 0226 to the CHICAGO, VINCENNBS and CTO 62.4 asking if they had been in action. He probably also intercepted the CHICAGO' a reply that she had been in battle but was not now, and CTG 62.4' s reply that his group had not been in action. It is highly probable that CTF 62 had also noted that CTO 62.6 was unable to get any replies from the QUINCY, VINCENNES or ASTORIA.
Later on, at about 0249, CTF 62 seems to have Intercepted a dispatch from the CHICAGO to CTO 62.6 which stated that the CHICAGO, which was south of Savo Island, had been hit by a torpedo and was slightly down by the bow; that the enemy ships had been firing to seaward; and that the CANBERRA was on fire with two destroyers standing by.
What CTF 62 thought, now that he had discovered that CTO 62.6 was missing from the battle area and that his ships had suffered severely, is nowhere stated; but it is significant that he took no action even to consult with CTO 62.6 by TBS voice or C.W. radio. It is likely that he believed that CTO 62.6 was capable of handling the situation, and therefore he should not interfere with him at this critical time. It also appears likely that he felt confident that, once that officer understood the rapidly developing situation, he would immediately inform him.
At 0310, CTF 62 received a message from CTO 62.6 which stated that a night action between surface ships was underway near Savo Island, but that as yet he had not been able to determine its character. CTF 62 then realised that CTO 62.6 knew as little as he did about the action, which was far from reassuring.
This situation must have become critioal - to his way of thinking - when at 0330 he intercepted the expected dispatoh from COMSOPACFOR to CTF 61 approving the withdrawal of TO 61.1. CTF 62 then promptly sent a dispatch to CTF 61 at 0340 in which he reported: "Surface attack on the screen coordinated with use of aircraft flares. CHICAGO hit torpedo. CANBERRA on fire." This message indicates a hope on the part of CTF 62 that CTF 61 might delay his planned withdrawal of TO 61.1 from the area in view of the bad news. Unfortunately, as will be pointed out later,this vital message was not received by CTF 61 until about eight hours later.
At 0410, CTF 62 received a message from the PATTERSON reporting the CANBERRA out of commission.
About this time, CTF 62 likely sensed that his screening forces had been heavily damaged, but the fact that his transports had not been attacked gave him assurance that perhaps the screen had succeeded in driving off the enemy raiding forces. Had he realised that actually they had not done so, but that instead there had been an almost open lane to his transports and cargo ships for the past two hours, he would have experienced great concern. As it was, he concluded that the execution of his tentative plan of retiring at about 0630 was now even more urgent than he had originally thought. He must depart or lose his ships. He could not be delayed! Even though the Commanding General, First Marine Division had not yet returned from Tulagi with the logistics Information upon which CTF 62 tentatively planned to base the time of his withdrawal, he now reached a decision to set his withdrawal time at 0630. For at 0435 he released two messages. The first was addressed to the Task Force, and read* "It is urgent for this force depart this area 0630!" The second message, addressed to CTO 62.6, read: "If CANBERRA cannot join retirement in time, she should be destroyed. Our departure urgent!
The decision to destroy the CANBERRA was probably an extremely difficult decision for CTF 62 to make. He of course knew that there was an over-all shortage of Allied combatant ships in the Pacific, and that every ship was vital for future operations. He had every reason to fear that his own cruisers, if not already sunk, would probably be out of action for some time while undergoing repairs. Finally, it is probable that he considered the effect that the destruction of the CANBERRA might have on Australian public opinion.
He appears to have based his decision on the following: He was retiring; he could not tow the CANBERRA away without air cover, as he would merely invite Japanese attack upon her - either by submarine or aircraft - and would probably lose thereby not only the CANBERRA but also one or more of the towing ships, which necessarily would be cruisers or destroyers. He oould not leave her to fall into Japanese hands, for if not salvaged by them, at least she would be thoroughly searched and studied. The correctness of this decision is borne out somewhat by the Executive Officer, CANBERRA who later stated: "It was realised the position was hopeless, and orders were given at approximately 0515 to stop efforts to save the ship and to prepare for abandoning. The list at this time had increased to about seventeen degrees and there had been internal explosions and rumblings.
At 0515, CTF 62 intercepted a message from the RALPH TALBOT to CTG 62.6 stating that she had been badly damaged and needed help.
At 0525, he was aware of gunfire on bearing 290°(T) from hie position; but he did not know the source of it - as he later indicated in a dispatch to CTF 61. This firing, which ceased at about 0527, was exchanged between the PATTERSON and the CHICAGO which had mistaken one another for enemy and had opened fire, fortunately without damage.
By this time, CTF 62 was becoming concerned about his unloading operations which had been interrupted by the transports and cargo ships getting underway at 0150. At sunrise, 0632, he noted that they were still underway. It is not clear whether he had heard as yet from the Commanding General, First Marine Division as to the logistics requirements at Tulagi. Certainly that Commanding General had not as yet returned to the MoCAWLEY.
The Commanding General, First Marine Division has recently stated that, after he had consulted with the senior officers at Tulagi – COMTRANSDIV EIGHT and the Commanding General Group YOKE (Tulagi) - apparently on board the transport NEVILLE, he had sent CTF 62 a dispatch by TBS voice radio from the SOUTHARD (probably initiated after 0500 when he had returned on board the SOUTHARD).**** This dispatch is not available to this study. However, Commanding General, First Marine Division states that to the best of his recollection he reported "that there was a day and a half of fire of ammunition ashore, that there was approximately three days of rations, that the island had not been completely secured; that TF 62 should not sail until more ammunition and rations were put ashore; and that he urged at least six hours more unloading before sailing." Whether or not this message was finally received by the MoCAWLEY (CTG 62 *s flagship) cannot be determined; but it is known that the SOUTHARD endeavored to send it throughout the remainder of the night.
Received or not, it seems clear that CTF 62 knew at this time that he had not succeeded in landing adequate supplies since his 2325 conference with the Commanding General, First Marine Division and CTG 62.6. He had learned this in part from his Assistant Chief of Staff who stated: "I had personally visited most of the transports of the Tulagi Transport Group that night and (had) urged the Commanding Offioers, including the Transport Group Commander, to get supplies unloaded, stating that these were Admiral Turner's orders."
CTF 62 once again had to choose between two alternatives* Should he remain until he had landed sufficient supplies to insure that the Marine oombat power was adequate to accomplish its objectives and thereby take the chance of losing many of his ships; or should he retire promptly, bearing in mind that he would thereby be jeopardising the Allied land operations through lack of sufficient logistic support and threatening the complete failure of the entire operation? Ha did not long delay in his decision. He correctly decided to remain and at 0641 informed CTF 61 of this decision as follows t "Unable depart as planned because insufficient supplies have been landed. Request air cover for attack on enemy surface forces this area. In this message, CTF 62 had plainly inferred that any losses which his command might suffer while unloading on the 9th - with or without air cover - were now warranted. This was a reversal of the decision expressed in his dispatch at 0106 wherein he had stated that it was necessary to retire to avoid unwarranted loss. and is an excellent example of CTF 62’s ability to recognise that the situation had changed - a primary qualification for command.
At 0644, COMDESRON FOUR reported the ASTORIA was in flames, and four destroyers were picking up her survivors.
A few minutes later, CTF 62 reported to CT6 62.6 along similar lines: "ASTORIA on fire. Captain and crew trying to save. Apparently QUINCY sunk. No news VINCENNES. Believe TALBOT sunk. Believe ships ran into submarine and surface torpedo trap.” This dispatch reveals the confusion which was in CTF 62' s mind, even at this late hour, concerning the nature of the night battle and once again points out the necessity for a subordinate to keep his interested commanders informed as to the progress and nature of any action in which said subordinate may be engaged.
Between dawn and about 0700, transports and cargo ships, which had been milling around in Iron Bottom Sound, had returned to their anchorages and had commenced unloading again.
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