In the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, Task Forse 16, under the command of Rear Admiral Kinkaid, was moving north from Noumea. In the morning of Nov 13th, 1942, USS Enterprise launched a 10 plane search by single planes and a strike consisting of 9 TBF and 6 VF, which eventually sank the Japanese battleship Hiei. Then Halsey ordered Kinkaid to form Task Force 64 to intercept a Japanese bombardment force. However, Task Force 16 was still too south to send Admiral Lee's two fast battleships to prevent another night bombardment of Henderson Field. On Nov 14, Kinkaid flew off nearly all the planes in searches and strikes with orders to fly to Hendersen Field, while he cleared out with Enterprise which remained 16 VF on board for air patrol. The air attacks by the Cactus Air Force and Air Group 10 almost wiped out the Japanese convoy, but after Admiral Lee won the second naval battle of Guadalcanal the last Japanese attempt to reconquer Guadalcanal ended in comlpete failure.
Captain Hardison, CO USS Enterprise, commented that "the employment of the Enterprise Air Group first from the ship and subsequently from the field at Cactus was an effective use of the Group and resulted in maximum damage to the enemy".
Rear Admiral Kinkaid, Commander Task Force Sixteen, was also satisfied with the employment of USS Enterprise and Air Group Ten in this battle. He wrote in his report as follows, "This time the air group on the carrier was utilized more effectively than ever before." "If enemy carriers come down from the north and northwest, as in the past, it may be permissible to let them come within easy range of our shore based aircraft and in waters made dangerous to them by our submarines, holding our carriers in reserve to strike at the right time and with full force."
Admiral Halsey, COMSOPAC, didn't contest Kinkaid's evaluation or publiccally criticize him. According to the first endorsement to the report of CTF 16, Halsey thought that "operations of the task force were conducted in an effective and efficinet manner". According to the second endorsement to the report of CO USS Enterprise, "By sending her planes to Catcus, the CV was able to remoe itself from the most likely vicinity of air attack, while the air group, due to the comparative proximity of the targets, got in a maximum number of attacks by shuttling back and forth from them."
COMINCH also praised this operation. According to Secret Info Bulletin No 4, it was "a sound employment of the carrier - i.e., go in boldly and strike and then retire at high speed".
However, there was criticism of Kinkaid's handling the task force. According to Rear Admiral Frederick C. Sherman, Rear Admiral Fitch, COMAIRSOPAC, was disagreed with Kinkaid's decision to release the Enterprise's plane to Catcus, "which was jammed and couldn't effectively handle them." Spruance commented in the general report of Feb 18, 1943 that "had it been possible to make a surface ship attack or to assemble part of the Enterprise group aboard for a strike towards Buin on 15 November, supported by Washington and undamaged cruisers of Task Force 16, a number of enemy cripples might have been disposed of and the defeated enemy caused greater loss than he had already suffered".
After the naval battle of Guadalcal, Sherman relieve Kinkaid as CTF-16, while Kinkaid would command cruisers again. John B. Lundstrom thought that these actions reflected Halsey's strong disapproval of Kinkaid's performance both at Santa Cruz and in the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal.
John B. Lundstrom also commented the failure to intercept a Japanese bombardment force as follows.
Actally, the U.S. Navy didn't meet the similar situation again, and the simliar use of planes from aircraft carriers was also hardly found in U.S. Navy. So my question is, did Kinkaid do bad in the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal? Was his relief from carrier command because of his poor performance from Halsey's point of view or only because of his not being a naval aviator?
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Here is the track chart of USS Enterprise.
Captain Hardison, CO USS Enterprise, commented that "the employment of the Enterprise Air Group first from the ship and subsequently from the field at Cactus was an effective use of the Group and resulted in maximum damage to the enemy".
Rear Admiral Kinkaid, Commander Task Force Sixteen, was also satisfied with the employment of USS Enterprise and Air Group Ten in this battle. He wrote in his report as follows, "This time the air group on the carrier was utilized more effectively than ever before." "If enemy carriers come down from the north and northwest, as in the past, it may be permissible to let them come within easy range of our shore based aircraft and in waters made dangerous to them by our submarines, holding our carriers in reserve to strike at the right time and with full force."
Admiral Halsey, COMSOPAC, didn't contest Kinkaid's evaluation or publiccally criticize him. According to the first endorsement to the report of CTF 16, Halsey thought that "operations of the task force were conducted in an effective and efficinet manner". According to the second endorsement to the report of CO USS Enterprise, "By sending her planes to Catcus, the CV was able to remoe itself from the most likely vicinity of air attack, while the air group, due to the comparative proximity of the targets, got in a maximum number of attacks by shuttling back and forth from them."
COMINCH also praised this operation. According to Secret Info Bulletin No 4, it was "a sound employment of the carrier - i.e., go in boldly and strike and then retire at high speed".
However, there was criticism of Kinkaid's handling the task force. According to Rear Admiral Frederick C. Sherman, Rear Admiral Fitch, COMAIRSOPAC, was disagreed with Kinkaid's decision to release the Enterprise's plane to Catcus, "which was jammed and couldn't effectively handle them." Spruance commented in the general report of Feb 18, 1943 that "had it been possible to make a surface ship attack or to assemble part of the Enterprise group aboard for a strike towards Buin on 15 November, supported by Washington and undamaged cruisers of Task Force 16, a number of enemy cripples might have been disposed of and the defeated enemy caused greater loss than he had already suffered".
After the naval battle of Guadalcal, Sherman relieve Kinkaid as CTF-16, while Kinkaid would command cruisers again. John B. Lundstrom thought that these actions reflected Halsey's strong disapproval of Kinkaid's performance both at Santa Cruz and in the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal.
John B. Lundstrom also commented the failure to intercept a Japanese bombardment force as follows.
"Central to this failure to meet the expected Japanese attack was a misunderstanding between Halsey and Kinkaid as to the proposed movements of TF-16. In retrospect Halsey should have been more specific as to where he desired Kinkaid to be. As for Kinkaid’s motives, the reports mention continuous flight operations that unexpectedly slowed the Enterprise’s northward speed of advance, but it seems clear that Kinkaid deliberately kept far to the south. Three weeks before he had suffered greatly from a head-long assault into the teeth of the Japanese forces; now he felt good reason to be more cautious."
Actally, the U.S. Navy didn't meet the similar situation again, and the simliar use of planes from aircraft carriers was also hardly found in U.S. Navy. So my question is, did Kinkaid do bad in the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal? Was his relief from carrier command because of his poor performance from Halsey's point of view or only because of his not being a naval aviator?
Here are the related messages.
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